The Exercise of the Voting Right in a Join-Stock Company by Slavíková, Lucie




The submitted thesis analyses the voting right of a shareholder and the exercise of the 
voting right in a joint-stock company. In the last few years, a tendency to encourage the 
engagement of shareholders and to broaden the scope of decision rights of shareholders can 
be seen. Nevertheless, some authors underestimate the importance of the shareholders’ right 
to vote and conclude that real decision-making power lies with the management or 
administrative board. The main hypothesis to be proven or rebutted is that the shareholder’s 
voting right is not insignificant and vesting decision-making power in shareholders can have 
a positive influence on the effectiveness of the management of the company notwithstanding 
the broad liberty of the shareholder to both freely exercise and dispose of the voting right (the 
shares) and notwithstanding the existence of deviations from the principle of proportionality. 
The thesis aims to examine the voting right in its complexity, in contrast to the 
prevailing approach of contemporary Czech jurisprudence, and to contribute to academic 
knowledge with original arguments and conclusions. This goal is achieved by extensive use of 
foreign legal sources, mainly French and Belgian literature and case law, since the Czech 
legal system mostly takes inspiration from German and Austrian legal sources.  
With the exception of the introductory part and conclusion, the thesis is composed of 
three chapters. The first chapter focuses on the nature and meaning of the shareholder’s voting 
right. Apart from defining the concept of the voting right in several dimensions, the main 
question is the extent of the shareholder’s freedom during exercise of the voting right 
(the limits of exercise) and in whose interest the voting right is or should be exercised. To 
answer these questions, the division of decision-making power in a company between the 
shareholders and the management or administrative body is explored, along with a historical 
overview. Next, it is examined why the voting right lies with shareholders (and not any other 
group of stakeholders) and what the purpose of the voting right is. The substantive content of 
the company interest is studied, as well as the fiduciary duty of the shareholder during voting 
(or abstaining). Finally, the means of protection of the company and other shareholders 
against the abuse of shareholder’s voting right are analysed. 
The second chapter focuses mainly on the number of votes conferred to the shareholder 
(the shareholder’s voting power) and its possible modifications. The number of votes can be 
proportionate to the sum paid up as subscription price of the shares or it can differ due to the 
use of control enhancing mechanisms (shares with preferential rights or without voting right, 
pyramid structures, or a voting cap), the suspension of the voting right or waiver of the voting 
right. Also, the effects of cumulative voting on the shareholder’s voting power are explained. 
Throughout the chapter, it is questioned whether Czech company law respects the “one share, 
one vote” principle (principle of proportionality).  
The third, and last, chapter focuses on the exercise of the voting right not only by the 
shareholder, but also by third parties. To this end, attention is first given to the means of 
attendance at the general meeting of the company and exercise of the voting right (or voting 
per rollam) by the shareholder and his representative. The possibility and the limits of the 
shareholder’s commitment to exercise of the voting right in a prescribed manner (typically by 
concluding a shareholder agreement) are inspected. Similarly, the possibility and means of 
transfer of the voting right to a third party are examined (by power of attorney or by 
conclusion of a contract that directly enables the third party to exercise the voting right). The 
question of admissibility of reward or compensation for the shareholder (vote buying) is 
explored.  
